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Chapter I. Introduction: 
“I can hear you, the rest of the world can hear you and the people who 
knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.”—President 
George Bush, Address to Ground Zero Workers, Delivered September 14, 
2001   
 The current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has 
fundamentally shifted foreign policy of virtually every country. “This new enthusiasm is partly 
justified by the belief that aid can be a powerful instrument in a broader campaign against global 
terrorism. But foreign aid is also supposed to serve other purposes, such as helping the fight 
against global poverty.”  In this paper, I argue that the two policy goals are not mutually 1
exclusive.  This link between fighting global poverty to combat terrorism insists that economic 
progress raises the opportunity cost of violence.  Fighting global poverty spurs growth and 
creates economic opportunities that make the cost of taking up violence too high. For this reason, 
foreign aid can be a powerful instrument in the campaign against global terrorism, not unless it 
helps the fight against global poverty, but because it helps to fight against global poverty.  
 “Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak 
institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug 
cartels within their borders.”  This quote from the National Security Strategy of the United States 2
of America explains the effect of poverty on the people of developing countries, it does not make 
people into terrorists but it creates an environment where the country is vulnerable to terrorism 
 Moss, Todd, Roodman, David, and Standley, Scott. The Global War on Terror and U.S. Development 1
Assistance: USAID allocation by country, 1998-2005. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/
2863_file_WP62_1.pdf Center for Global Development. 2005
 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002. https://www.state.gov/2
documents/organization/63562.pdf
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becoming the only option for survival.  It is important to define terrorism to understand the 
relationship between aid and terrorism, and terrorism and poverty. “Terrorism is the premeditated 
use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social 
objective through the intimidation of a wide audience beyond the of the immediate victims”   3
Within this definition they provided are two crucial elements that differentiates acts of terrorism 
from ordinary crimes or political or social protests; a political or social motive and the presence 
of violence (either in threat or in action).  As explained in their work, these two elements are 
essential.  Another element of terrorism is the facade of randomness applied to their targets.  
Their actions appear spontaneous and random to intimidate a broader audience by creating 
anxiety. However, unlike other crimes, acts of terror are not random, nor are they spontaneous.  
They are well-planed attacks that calculate possible risks, costs, and gains associated with the 
attack.  4
 In this paper, I will analyze the foreign aid data and instances of terrorism from 1990 to 
2015 in sub-saharan Africa.  Using the data I will establish the relationship between foreign aid 
and terrorism, explaining what factors increase and decrease the instances of terrorism.  I will be 
looking at economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product and growth rate to determine the 
effect of economic development on terrorism.  I examine the effect pf military expenditure  on 
the number of instances of terrorism because as the next chapter will explain there is a debate 
over the effect of increasing military spending on terrorism.  I will also look at an index for 
democracy in a country to see if government types have an effect on terrorism.  After the 
 Enders, Walter and Sandler, Todd. The Political Economy of Terrorism. 20053
 Ibid. 4
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economic regression I will analyze the and interpret the results.  The results themselves are not as 
important as the effects that can come out of them.  The results will dictate how policy should 
shift towards dealing with foreign aid, the war on terrorism and the war on poverty.  After the 
global war on terror began, foreign aid policy shifted toward military aid at the expense of  
development aid.  The model should show whether this policy is effective and if not, what the 
most effective policy would be.  
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Chapter II.  Theoretical Argument: 
  
 In the aid-conflict debate there is generally two camps that have divided the issue into the 
effects foreign aid has on the probability of conflict within the host country (the country that 
receives the aid).  The camps are as such; the foreign aid either raises the probability of domestic 
conflict or the foreign aid reduces the probability of civil war or domestic conflict.  Domestic 
conflict in this instance is loosely described as the current government of the host country against 
a rebel group fundamentally opposed to the government in power.  First, I will broadly lay out 
the two competing sides of the aid-conflict debate and describe the logical backing for either 
side.  Second, I will go into detail on the conditions required for each.  And lastly, I will describe 
in further detail special cases that have grown into their own study, though still being broadly 
identifiable by one of the two general camps.   
 However, prior to getting into the argument surrounding the effects of aid on conflict; 
there are a few general points about the nature of foreign aid made by those who write on this 
phenomenon.  The first is made by Tahir in her paper on Pakistan, “While aid is allocated on the 
basis of trade and business opportunities, there is hardly any evidence that aid is associated with 
the promotion of human rights and democracy.”.   Too often aid is confused with giving money 5
away or throwing money at a problem, like poverty, war, or hunger. As Nadia elaborates: aid is 
given to protect strategic and economic interests of the donor, such as the West’s target of aid to 
reduce terrorism rather than military intervention.  Thinking of aid in these terms makes it less 
 Tahir, Nadia. 2017. “Does Aid Cause Conflict in Pakistan?”. Defense and Peace Economics,   5
28:1, 112-135, 
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about helping the people in the country and more about keeping the stability or continuity in 
power.  Allowing those in power to control perceived threats to the donor countries and/or 
stabilize economic opportunities for the donor countries.  Along the same lines Ree and Nillesen 
make the claim that foreign aid typically supports any leadership.   Thus including leadership 6
that is unwarranted by the majority of the population.  Citing African regimes as being 
surprisingly durable despite economic stagnation and other problems on the whole that are 
associated with the continent.  This durability is, in no small part, due to the large amount of 
foreign aid that is poured into African countries with leaders doing just enough reform to satisfy 
donors while using the rest to stay in power.  Therefore the positive effects of reducing death and 
civil conflict may be outweighed by the negative effects of keeping the government in power.  
Does foreign aid give a dictator the ability to reduce liberties further? 
2.1 Foreign Aid Reduces Probability of Conflict 
 Foreign Aid decreases the likelihood of civil war indirectly, by spurring economic 
growth, reducing government reliance on primary commodity exports , and by increasing 7
government military expenditure through aid fungibility.  Aid resources are a good place for 
rebels to capture and therefore feed instability, spurring economic growth create economic 
alternative for rebels.  Aid predominately works in countries with good economic policies.  
When the country has good economic policies and institutions aid is expected to increase income 
per capita in the country and thus is expected to decrease the probability of conflict by allowing 
 Nillesen, Eleonora and Ree, Jopp de.  2009.  “Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign  6
Aid on the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Journal of Development Economics 
 Commodity exports encourage rent-seeking behavior and are often sources of rebel funding.7
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alternative economic opportunities to evolve and improve.  For example Tahir (2017), says uses 
the success of the Marshall Plan as an example of aid working in good policy environment.  She 
takes it a step further stating that it is the earliest evidence that aid works only in democratic and 
well-functioning societies.   
 Collier and Hoeffler were among the first to emphasize the relationship between civil 
conflict and economic factors.  Within this relationship there are certain economic indicators; 
low per capita income, badly performing institutions, dependence on primary commodity exports 
that have been associated with higher risk of civil conflict. Increased income, not only creates 
economic alternatives for rebels, it also reduces countries dependency on primary commodity 
exports marginalizing looting opportunities for rebels reducing their survival chances.   In theory 8
the aid should also increase the performance and stability of institutions in the country, however 
this is not always the case.   
 According to Feyzioglu, the donor community has become increasingly concerned that 
aid intended for development progress in the economic and public sectors might be used directly 
or indirectly to increase military expenditures. Aid fungibility refers to the potential for aid to be 
diverted for purposes other than those intended by its donor, and is an important determinant in 
whether aid increases or decreases violence.  Aid fungibility is a double-edged sword for the 9
state.  The negatives will be further discussed in the section describing how foreign aid can 
increase the probability of conflict, this section will focus on the major positive associated with 
the ability to divert aid—increased military expenditure.  The intuition behind this concept of 
 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 1998. “On Economic Causes of Civil War” Oxford Economic   8
Papers 563-573 
 Feyzioglu, Tarhan and Swaroop, Vinaya and Zhu, Min. 1998. “A Panel Data Analysis of the   9
Fungibility of Foreign Aid” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12 No. 1: 29-58
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deterrence is that the larger the military of the state the less likely the chances of the rebels will 
have of winning.  Therefore, there is a decreased risk of civil war breaking out because the risk 
to reward analysis is a deterrent to rebels trying to seize the government.   
 Based on Ree and Nillesen, foreign aid can also affect the the probability of civil conflict 
continuation both negatively and significantly.   Using sub-Saharan Africa as the region of study 10
aid flows were found to reduce the duration of civil conflicts.  A 10% increase in foreign aid is 
estimated to decrease the probability of continuation by about 8 percentage points, the 
unconditional probability of conflict continuation is about 90%.  They conclude the research 
saying “foreign aid flows may be an important tool to policy- makers and aid agencies in 
preventing future conflict.” This can mean that aid flows are more important than the actual aid 
itself, sudden and major increases in aid may reduce the risk of civil conflict, while sudden 
withdrawal causes more violent conflict. 
2.2 Foreign Aid Increases Probability of Conflict  
 Foreign aid increases the probability of conflict because aid increases the prize to be won 
from rebellion.  The government may use aid as a way of deterring the rebels from engaging in 
conflict, however deterrence is not always successful. The rebels may decide to go to war to win 
control of the aid rather than settle with what the government offers.  The increased spoils for 
capturing the capital motivates the onset of rebellion and contributes to prolonging the conflict 
by changing the ongoing conflict dynamics.  There is a comparison between foreign aid and 
natural resources, which I will address later on, however briefly aid like other resources trigger 
 Nillesen, Eleonora and Ree, Jopp de.  2009.10
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rent-seeking behavior to ensure the survival of rebellion once it has started.  There is also the 
idea that rebels can gain from aid without capturing the state.  Aid to government is a rent not 
income received through taxation.  Rent arises from conditions of scarcity and is paid to the 
owner of the resource, such as profits from natural resources like oil.  When rents rise through 
foreign aid it triggers rent seeking behavior to motivate rebellion and to ensure the survival of 
rebellion once the war has started.  
 Natural resources are a good comparison to foreign aid more than just their rent 
similarities, the two are also alike in their capacity to be both a blessing and a curse.  The latter 
being the focus.  The natural resource curse is defined as phenomenon that tries to understand 
why countries blessed with valuable resources within their borders have not been able to prosper 
and achieve a strong economy. Countries like Angola (diamonds), Venezuela (oil), and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (coltan) have have not been made rich by their valuable natural 
resources but rather trapped by them.  In Harford and Klein, this resource curse is applied to 
foreign aid. Institutions interact with aid in much the same way as resources do.  As found by 
research resource endowments more likely lead to weakened institutions so too does aid 
endowments lead to weakened institutions.   This creates a vicious circle because as Tahir 11
mentioned aid works in good policy environments with strong institutions in place, or as she puts 
it democratic and well-functioning societies.  12
 Some arguments aid intensifies ethnic cleavages which can make conflict more likely or 
that foreign aid increases the payoffs to rebels initiating a civil war by increasing the value of 
 Harford, Tim and Klein, Michael. 2005. “Aid and the Resource Curse”. The World Bank Group,  11
Public Policy for the Private Sector.
 Tahir, Nadia. 2017.12
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capturing the state.  Others argue that aid decease the risk of civil war by promoting economic 
growth and strengthening state capabilities. However both assume that aid transfers are steady 
and predictable— aid flows are often unstable and uncertain up to 40% more volatile than gov 
revenue.  Similar to resources and commodities aid flows are volatile and prone to what Nielsen 
describes as shocks—sever decreases in aid revenues that shift domestic balance of power and 
induce violence.  Negative aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict.   13
Using Mali as an example of conflict arising from aid shocks, shows how Mali became reliant on 
foreign assistance which accounted for more than 30% of its budget.  The aid was used to broker 
peace in the Tuareg region but when aid flows were drastically reduced in 1989 the government 
was unable to provide the same level of assistance to the region.  The following year the Tuareg 
region initiated its rebellion against the Mali government.  
 In the same way that aid fungibility allows the state to increase its’ military expenditure 
in order to deter the rebels from starting conflict, but there is an unintended consequence from 
aid being easily diverted.  Increasing military expenditure can create a stronger government 
military force that may deter rebels from attacking, or it may lead the rebels to strengthen their 
own forces creating an arms race.  This arms race increases the instability in the country and 
raises the probability of conflict because of the rising stakes and strength of both sides.  This is 
because gaining access to the increasing government aid rents may out weigh the cost of fighting 
for the rebels.  Incentives created for rebellion and civil violence is likely caused, at least 
partially, by high levels of foreign aid.  
 Nielsen, Richard and Findley, Michael. 2011. “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed 13
Conflict.”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 219-232 
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2.3 Link Between Civil Conflict and Terrorism  
 In order to explain the links between civil conflict and terrorism, it is necessary to first 
define what each of these terms mean.  James Fearon defines civil war as “a violent conflict 
within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, 
or to change government policies. Everyday usage of the term "civil war" does not entail a clear 
threshold for how much violence is necessary to qualify a conflict as a civil war, as opposed to 
terrorism or low-level political strife.”    14
 Where Enders and Sandler define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use 
violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the 
intimidation of a wide audience beyond the of the immediate victims.”   Within this definition 15
they provided are two crucial elements that differentiates acts of terrorism from ordinary crimes 
or political or social protests; a political or social motive and the presence of violence (either in 
threat or in action).  As explained in their work, these two elements are essential.  Another 
element of terrorism is the facade of randomness applied to their targets.  Their actions appear 
spontaneous and random to intimidate a broader audience by creating anxiety. However, unlike 
other crimes, acts of terror are not random, nor are they spontaneous.  They are well-planed 
attacks that calculate possible risks, costs, and gains associated with the attack.    16
 The link between the two is clear.  In both civil conflict and terrorism, an individual or 
group aim’s to change the government policies through violence or the threat of violence.  The 
 Fearon, James. Iraq's Civil War. Foreign Affairs. March 2007. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/14
iraq/2007-03-01/iraqs-civil-war 
 Enders, Walter and Sandler, Todd. The Political Economy of Terrorism. 15
 Ibid. 16
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extent to which the two concepts overlap proves that they should be thought of in similar ways, 
and that is the goal of this paper.  It uses instances of terrorism as proxies for civil conflict, as 
they both are violent in nation and aim to change something in the government. Often times acts 
of terror are strategic actions within a civil war.  Typically, insurgent groups are overpowered by 
the government in resources, man power, and capital; terrorism is a tactic to fight a superior 
opponent. Therefore because of the similarity, the debate over civil conflict relationship with 
foreign aid should have many overlaps with the relationship between terrorism and foreign aid.  17




Chapter III. Empirical Analysis: 
“‘Data! Data! Data!’ he cried impatiently. ‘I can’t make bricks without 
clay.’”—Sherlock Holmes, The Adventure of the Cooper Beeches 
  
 This section undertakes a econometric analysis of the impact of foreign aid on the 
frequency of terrorism, using sub-saharan African countries as the area of interest. A cross-
national, time-series data analysis of 43 countries for 1990–2015.  Sub-Saharan Africa is an area 
of great interest and is the perfect area to study because of the amount of aid that the region 
annually receives, because of the varying levels of development, and because of the large amount 
of terroristic incidents.  In order to study the area, it is first necessary to define it.  There is some 
controversy and disagreement on which countries constitute Sub-Saharan Africa.  Depending on 
what institution you look at or who you ask, the country list could vary slightly.  For this paper, I 
based the definition of Sub-Saharan Africa on the United Nations Development Program , 18
which lists 46 countries constituting the region.  I further dropped Cape Verde, Sao Tome and 
Principe, and South Sudan because of a lack of available information on the three countries; 
leaving 43 countries to be observed.  
 The next parameter to define is the time period.  For this analysis, I decided on a twenty-
six year period from 1990 to 2015. This time frame allowed the aid enough time to take effect 
and study the countries over a broad time period to get a more accurate sense of the region.  It is 
also important to note that the period covers both the period before the global war on terror, the 
catalyst of the war (9/11), and the period following the global war on terror. 
 United Nations Development Programme. About Sub-Saharan Africa. http://www.africa.undp.org/18
content/rba/en/home/regioninfo.html 
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 Of the three principle reasons this area is highly interesting; the sheer amount of aid it 
receives is incredible. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OCED) 
is an organization that promotes policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of 
people around the world.  It is also the organization that is responsible for the data on official 
development aid (ODA), which is the amount of aid each country received.  The ODA money is 
provided by a network of donors called the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a group 
of 30 countries that discusses issues surrounding aid, development, and poverty reduction in 
developing countries.  It is the self-described “venue and voice” of the world’s major donor 
countries.   Of the recipients ‘South of Sahara’ is the largest by region at 22.8% of total net 19
ODA, ‘South and Central Asia’ is the next largest region at 11.8%.   20
  
3.1 Relationship between FA and Terror 
 As shown in chapter 2, the literature is split in the relationship between foreign aid and 
violent conflict, in this case terrorism. With the global war on terror causing shifts in foreign 
policy related to foreign aid; whether development or military aid yields better results and 
whether aid can still fight poverty in the shift toward fighting terror.  The relationship between 
the two has never been more important to foreign policy. Therefore, it is of vital importance that 
there relationship be analyzed using data from the past in order to find whether development aid 
is effective in fighting terrorism, and whether the war on poverty and the war on terror may be 
more related than previously thought.  In this paper, the assumption that will be put to the test is 
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The History of OECD’s Development 19
Assistance Committee. http://www.oecd.org/dac/1896808.pdf 
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://public.tableau.com/views/20
AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1 
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that an increase, or high amount of  foreign aid leads to a lower amount of terrorism.  This is the 
assumption because development aid will increase economic activity in developing nations, such 
as the nations in sub saharan Africa, and with the increased economic activity will bring less 
reason to protest against government policies.   
  
3.1.1 Terror is Dependent Variable 
 One of the two most important variable in the  model,  the dependent variable of this 
regression is instances of terrorism sourced from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).   This 21
is the variable everything will be based off of.  The purpose of this study is to see what elements 
of an economy affect the number of terror instances.  Terrorism, specifically acts of terrorism, is 
hard to definitively define.  While the broad elements of terrorism are generally agreed on, there 
is often disagreement on the details.  For this reason it is important to understand the definition 
used by the GTD in the construction of their database.  Information on incidents are is drawn 
from publicly available, open sourced materials such as electronic news sources, existing data 
sets, books, journals and legal documents.  Incidents were collected according to the following 
definition of terrorism: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state 
actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation.”   This definition is linked to the earlier one mentioned by Enders and Sandler, 22
where terrorism has three key elements; premeditated action by a non-state actor that threatens or 
directly uses violence to attain political change through intimidation and fear, conveying the 
 Global Terrorism Database. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 21
 Ibid.22
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message to a larger audience than the immediate victim.  It is a direct action against the state of 
government in the country and often times fits within the context of civil war.  
  
3.1.2 Foreign Aid is Variable of Interest  
 The question whether foreign aid enhances economic growth has long been debated.  
Jefferey Sachs and William Easterly represent the two sides of the debate. Sachs argues that 
foreign aid is an important tool for poverty reduction and development, while easterly suggests 
that foreign aid does not reach the poor.   This paper works on the conceptonproposed by Sachs, 23
that aid is instrumental in reducing poverty and increasing economic development.  In achieving 
these two goals, economic opportunity is created incentivizing away from violence in the form of 
terrorism.  The DAC of the OCED defines foreign aid as a resource flows provided by official 
agencies with the intent to promote economic development.  The data for this variable is soured 24
from the OCED database.  25
3.2 Data and Methodology 
 At the broadest level there are two basic types of data; quantitive and qualitative.  
Quantitive data deals with things you can measure objectively.  Qualitative deals with 
characteristics that cannot be easily measured, but subjectively observed.  This data is quantitive.  
 Acevedo, Ivonne. Does Foreign Aid Have an Effect on Economic Growth? http://23
chicagopolicyreview.org/2016/06/15/does-foreign-aid-have-an-effect-on-economic-growth-new-research-
adds-to-the-debate/ Chicago Policy Review. 2016.
 Apodaca, Clair. Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool.  http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/24
acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332 Oxford Research Encyclopedias. 
2017 
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://data.oecd.org 25
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Yet, the quantitive group can be further refined into two distinct groups; continuous and discrete.  
As a general rule counts are discrete and measurements are continuous.  Data in this model is 
count data. It is not continuous, but a discrete number of instances every year for a twenty-six 
year period, for each of the forty-three countries observed. 
3.2.1 Count Data 
  In count data the underlying variable in eace case is discrete, taking a non-
negative integer/number of values for a finite period of time.  It can often be comprised of rare or 
infrequent occurrences, in many cases, taking zero for the majority of observations.  The 
distribution is not normal but highly skewed because of the frequent number of years without a 
instance of terror, and the infrequent outbursts of terror instances.  As shown by Figure 1 below, 
the visual representation of instances of terror shows that the distribution is highly skewed to the 
right and does not follow a normal distribution.  The summary statistics (Table 1) of the variable 
confirm that the variance is incredibly high at 1136.55, normal variance is near zero. The kurtosis 
also shows a lack of symmetry in the tails, 208.8 is high when compared to a normal distribution 
having a value near three. A positive kurtosis value indicates a heavy-tailed with multiple 
outliers.  The significant skewness and kurtosis indicate that the distribution of the data does not 
follow a normal distribution.  Therefore, the ordinary least squares (OLS) model is not 
appropriate for count data.  
 17
Figure 1. Histogram of Instances of Terror
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Instances of Terror
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3.2.2 Count Data Modeling Options    
 To model this phenomenon a probability distribution is needed to take into account the 
unique features of count data.  There are two options to model this type of data; the Poisson 
Regression Model (PRM) and the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM). The model 
often used to model count data is the PRM.  However, a restrictive feature of the PRM is that it 
requires equal dispersion; where the mean and the variance are equal. In practice the variance is 
usually higher than the mean, over dispersion.  For this reason the results of a PRM should not be 
accepted at face value. The assumption of the Poisson distribution underlying the estimated 
model needs to be tested. According to Table 1, the variance is nearly 200 times larger than the 
mean, meaning there is over dispersion.  There are two ways of correcting the standard error 
correcting for over dispersion: one by the method of quasi-maximum likelihood estimation 
(QMLE) and the other by the method of generalized linear model (GLM).  However, if the 
assumption of equal dispersion underlying the PRM cannot be sustained, alternative models need 
to be sought out.  Before we can run a Poisson regression, even though we believe that the 
Poisson distribution is not correct.  The regression can be followed up with the ‘poisgof’ 
command which tests the poisson goodness-of-fit (gof). This sequence is shown below in Table 
2.  The large value of chi-squared in the gof and a significant (p<0.05) test statistic both indicate 
that the poisson model is inappropriate.  26
  
  
 Gujarati, Damodar. Econometrics by Example, second edition. 26
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 After definitively proving that the PRM is not appropriate for this data, an alternative 
model is needed.  One alternative is the NBRM which is based of the Negative Binomial 
Regression Distribution (NBRD) and is often more appropriate in cases of over dispersion.  In 
this regression distribution it can be shown that 
σ²= µ +(µ²/r); µ>0, r>0 
Table 2. Poisson Regression Model
 20
where σ² is the variance, µ is the mean and r is the parameter of the model.   As shown by the 27
equation above, the variance is always larger than the mean in the NBPD, in contrast with the 
Poisson PDF where the variance equals mean.  For this reason the NBPD is more appropriate to 
use for count data than the PPD.  It is also to note that as r approaches ∞ and p (the probability of 
success) approaches 1, the NBPD approaches the Poisson PDF, assuming mean µ stays 
constant.   Table 3 below shows that the PRM greatly underestimated the values because of the 28
over dispersion, for example the z scores, coefficient, and standard error are all significantly 
lower in the Poisson model than in the NBRM. The log likelihood in the NBRM is also greater 
than the poisson model, and the LR chi score is much lower in the NBRM; all indicators of the 
negative binomial regression model being the more appropriate model to use for this type of 
data.  
 For NBPD the parameters are p, the probability of success, and r, the number of successes.27
 Ibid.28
Table 3. Negative Binomial Regression
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3.4 Controls 
3.4.1 Real GDP per Capita  
 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita represents the level of development in 
the country adjusted for inflation.  It is the broadest quantitative measure of a nations total 
economic activity, representing the monetary value of all goods and services produces within a 
nation’s borders.  GDP per capita is the national income per person, calculated by diving a 
country’s GDP by its total population.  This is important when doing cross country comparisons 
like the one this paper presents.  It is a direct measure of productivity and an indirect measure of 
living standards, the higher the GDP per capita the higher, theoretically, the standard of living of 
the people of the country. It is theoretically because there can be income inequality as not 
everyone makes the exact same share.  Inequality varies by country, however as a broad figure it 
is often cited as assessing the standard of living and that will be how it is used in this paper. It is 
important to use real GDP because of the comparisons between different years as it is adjusted 
for inflation. This data is sourced from the World Bank.  29
3.4.2 Annual Growth Rate 
 Economic growth can be considered among the most crucial indicators of the overall 
state of an economy.  Bringing in Annual Growth Rate of the country accounts for the pace of 
development in the country.  An economic growth rate is a measure of economic growth from 
one period to another in the form of a percentage. In practice, the measure is usually the rate of 
 The World Bank Group. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?29
end=2016&start=1967. 
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change that a  nations GDP goes through from year to year.  The growth rate provides insight as 
to the direction and extent of growth for the overall economy.  Also, the stage of development of 
an economy is important to know when comparing two economies; because growth rates of 
developing countries are on average higher than those in developed countries.  Comparisons 
between countries like the United States and China will not be accurate, but comping countries in 
the same stage of development, in the same region, can provide a clearer picture. This data is 
also sourced from the World Bank.  30
3.5.3 Trade Openness  
 The majority of papers use the trade ratio as a measure of trade policy, that is trade 
openness is represented by the equation exports plus imports as a share of GDP multiplied by 
one hundred.  Integration in the global economy is an important determinant in both of the 
variables above.  Although there are arguments against developing countries opening up to 
international trade, it is generally considered effective to spurring  economic growth and 
innovation.  Economic theory has identified just how trade is believed to promote economic 
progress; “trade is believed to promote the efficient allocation of resources, allow a country to 
realize economies of scale and scope, facilitate the diffusion of knowledge, foster technological 
progress, and encourage competition both in domestic and international markets that leads to an 
 Ibid.30
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optimization of the production processes and to the development of new products.”   This data 31
was is also from the World Bank database.  32
3.5.4 Military Expenditure  
 A crucial element to bring into the model because of the literature and theory involved in 
using increased military expenditure as a deterrent to violence. The ida of deterrence in the 
conflict literature is the larger the military of the state the less likely the chances of the rebels 
will have of winning.  Terrorism is similar in that the risk reward of achieving their political or 
economical objectives diminishes when the military power is overwhelming. The allocation of 
funds toward high increases in military expenditure also usually come at the cost of development 
expenditure.  The opportunity cost between military spending and economic development spring 
is also important because it is the concept of preemptive vs reactionary measures.  Increasing 
military spending fights against the terrorists, economic development creates opportunities that 
make the conditions forcing people into taking up violence. This study aims to examine whether 
this idea the increased allocation of resources for military spending is helpful in reducing the 
number of terrorist incidents. This variable is formulated by taking military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, the data is from the World Bank.  33
  
 Busse, Matthias & Königer, Jens. Trade and Economic Growth: A Re-examination of the Empirical 31
Evidence. Hamburg Institute of International Economics. http://www.hwwi.org/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/
HWWI_Research_Paper-123_Trade-and-Growth.pdf
 The World Bank Group.32
 Ibid. 33
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3.5.5 Polity Index  
 This control variable is interesting because it is one the only one that more qualitative 
than quantitative. The polity data series is widely used in political science research.  The data 
contains information on the level of democracy in independent states with populations greater 
than 500,000 and covers a time period of 1800 to the present.  The index is based on an 
evaluation of that state's elections for competitiveness and openness, the nature of political 
participation in general, and the extent of checks on executive authority.  These indicators create 
a “polity score” that ranges from -10 to 10; -10 to -6 corresponding to autocracies, -5 to 5 
corresponding to anocracies, and 6-10 corresponding to democracies.  This variable is important 
because it describes the environment in the country, and the environment for dissent against the 
government. The data and polity scores were soured from the Polity Project.   34
3.5.6 Population 
 The final control variable is total population of a country.  The amount of people in a 
country is an important because the more people the more the GDP is divided to find individual 
income, the more people there are that need economic opportunity, and the more people who 
may turn to terrorism if that economic opportunity is not there.  This variable is important 
because it puts the country in context and is important for comparing countries of different sizes 
together. The data was sourced from the World Bank.  35
 Polity Project.  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html 34
 The World Bank Group. 35
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3.5 Discuss the Results  
 Table 3 shows the results of the negative binomial regression of all the variables; 
instances of terror, ODA per capita, real GDP per capita, annual growth rate, trade openness, 
military expenditure, polity index, and population.  The regression results show that there is a 
negative relationship between aid an conflict, how increased amount of foreign aid has led to a 
decrease in the instances of terrorism.   
 ODA per capita, real GDP per capita, annual growth rate, and trade openness all had 
negative coefficients and were statistically significant.  This means that as these variables 
increased the instances of terrorism decreased by their respective coefficient. It is interesting 
because aside from the variable of interest, ODA per capita, all of these variables are related to 
economic development.  Real GDP the level of development, growth rate representing the pace 
of development, and trade openness representing the integration into the global economy.  This is 
an indication that spurring economic growth and opportunities increases the cost of taking up 
violence, a point that will be expanded upon in the next section.  
 The other variables have the opposite relationship with instances of terror.  Military 
expenditure, polity index, and population all show that as their value increases, so do the 
instances of terror.  These prove counter to the claims that increasing military expenditure 
decreases the risk of terrorism, it does not seem to act as a deterrent. The population variable is 
not surprising as the population increases it is understandable that the instances of terror could 
increase because there is less opportunities and more of an incentive to take up violence.  The 
interesting point is the polity index, showing that as a country was more democratic it had more 
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instances of terror.  This might seem counterintuitive, but there are logical reasons why this may 









































Chapter IV. Conclusion: 
“You can never win a war against terror as long as there are conditions 
in the world that make people desperate — poverty, disease, ignorance.” 
—Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
 The data and econometric modeling used in this paper was to examine the relationship 
between foreign aid and terrorism in sub-saharan Africa. It was to identify the factors that 
decreased instances of terror and the factors that increased terrorism.  The model was successful 
in identifying this factors and putting a numeric value on its effectiveness, which makes for a 
great table but should not be the end goal of the analysis.  The objective of this analysis is to 
have policy implications for foreign aid donors, specifically the United Staes because it is the 
largest donor in the DAC and the leader in the war on terror.  In the GWOT we have been 
fighting what seems to be a losing battle since it’s inception in 2001, which can be attributed to 
not knowing the most effective way to combat terrorism.  At the beginning of a new war the 
effective practices are not known immediately, there is a period of trial and error.  A period that 
yields data to be analyzed and investigated to find which practices are effective and which are 
not.  This period of trial and error should be come more narrow, focusing on what has worked in 
the past or what has worked in specific areas; namely how foreign aid and the economic 
development associated with it have been effective in reducing instances of terror in sub-saharan 
Africa.  As shown in regression model (Table 3), foreign aid is working as a factor in reducing 
terrorism in sub-saharan Africa. This section explains why foreign aid is working in sub-saharan 
Africa, what is not working, and how policy should be adjusted to fight terrorism more 
efficiently.  
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4.1 Economic Development is Good  
 As shown in table 3, economic development is factor in the fight against terrorism that 
has been effective at reducing the instances of terror in sub-saharan Africa.  The two indicators of 
economic development, real GDP per capita and annual growth rate,  both had negative relations 
with terrorism meaning that when they rose instances of terror fell. Instances of terror falling can 
be, at the very least, partial attributed to the increased economic opportunity that economic 
development creates. The work of Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen “emphasizes the 
need for meaningful choice as the end and the means of development. Choice is powerful and 
opens the door to hope, opportunity, change, and a better future.”   Without choice people are 36
put into desperate situations and forces people to commit desperate actions.  
 Relative deprivation theory is a theory in sociology that focuses on social change and 
movements, which could be loosely applied to acts of terrorism.  The theory is that people take 
action for social change in order to acquire something that others possess and which they believe 
they should have too. This can be applied to economic opportunities and opportunity cost.  When 
there are no economic opportunities, the opportunity cost of violence is not very high because it 
is really the only option for survival.  According to the deprivation theory, people will take up 
action to acquire economic opportunities.  This action will often times be violent in nature and 
can result in terrorism if dealing with an overwhelming state. However, if there are economic 
opportunities the opportunity cost of becoming violent is significantly higher because they would 
have to forfeit the opportunity to make money to take up violence.  When economic development 
increases the opportunity cost of violence increases to the point where it is no longer an option.  
 Harriman, Jake. Linking Extreme Poverty and Global Terrorism. The New York Times. March 13, 36
2012. 
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 Economic development also reduces grievances of the people.  Acts of terror have a 
motivations and goals, they are not random acts of violence for violence sake.  This is a crucial 
element of terrorism, they aim to change a policy whether it is; social, political, economical or 
otherwise.  In this way acts of terror are often times embodiments of public grievances.  
Increasing military expenditure to suppress terrorism is the same as suppressing the public 
grievances which will only create more grievances.  From this standpoint, increasing military 
power to suppress can have the opposite of the desired effect.  Economic development on the 
other hand can reduce economic grievances, or the underlying cause of some acts of terrorism.   
4.2 Trade is Good  
 Integration into the global market creates positive economic results.  Countries that are 
open to trade benefit from increased efficiency, access to more products and larger markets, and 
exposure to new technology and innovation.  These benefits international trade provides directly 
contribute to the economic development of developing countries, so the results from the 
regression in table 3 make sense.  When a country is more open to trade they experience less 
terrorism.  Terrorism can also be detrimental to trade raising the cost of doing business with 
terror-affected countries.  This can have a spiraling effect as prices rise reducing the amount of 
exports and imports of a country, making it less open for trade and increasing the amount of 
terrorism instances.  37




4.3 Military Expenditure 
 Even though there are reasons to doubt the reliability of these results, related to the 
principles of causality, where increased military expenditure could be a response to increased 
terrorism.  An argument could be made that the effect of terrorism could be a cause for increased 
military expenditure.  However it seems that raising the military expenditure does not have much 
of an effect on the number of terrorism instances.  The data from table 3 shows that instances of 
terror actually increase as military expenditure increases.  This is contrary to the argument that 
increased military spending acts as deterrent to violence.  Taking this into account foreign aid for 
development should be prioritized over military aid, rather than the other way around. Increasing 
military expenditure is a reactionary response to terrorism, attempting to increase the ability to 
suppress it rather than stoping its development in the first place.  In a war it is not easy to win 
when you are merely reacting to what the enemy is doing, this strategy requires time and 
sacrifice to have a chance at succeeding.  Instead of reacting, efforts could be made to attack 
before terrorism is fully developed, this is the point of economic development.  
4.5 Polity index 
 American policymakers have consistently advanced the idea that creating democracies 
out of autocracies will reduce terrorism.  It has become part of security policy, democracy has 
become the solution to terrorism in the eyes of policy makers.  The idea that people will be 
satisfied with the more free and economically prosperous form of government.  Many scholars 
have pushed back on this idea, citing multiple historical examples of democracy actually 
bringing more terrorism.  The global spread of democracy will not end global terrorism because 
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democracies may be more susceptible to terrorism than other forms of government.  How this 
isn’t actually a bad thing or a call for more authoritative regimes. “There are five primary groups 
of explanations for this phenomenon, including the openness of democratic systems, 
organizational pressures resulting from democratic competition, the problem of underreporting in 
authoritarian regimes, gridlock resulting from multiparty institutions, and the coercive 
effectiveness of terrorism against democracies.”  This explains why there is an increase in 38
instances of terror as the polity index increases.  This is also not an argument against democracy, 
as many of the explanations for the phenomenon benefit the people of the country more than 
terrorism harms them, it is simply an explanation for the data.  It also shows that democracy is 
not the silver bullet policy makers make it out to be, the end of global terrorism will not be 
because democracy has been spread to every government.  
4.7 Conclusion 
 The evils of economic destitution are contributing to the global war on terror. A country 
that lacks economic opportunity, is populated by a people who lack basic needs and the ability to 
make choices that will improve their lives.  The concept that increasing military expenditure to 
combat terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is not working in practice.  It is a reactionary measure 
that aims to suppress terrorism rathe than remove the root causes of it.  Foreign aid for 
development creates economic opportunity that reduces the need to take up violence and makes 
the opportunity cost of terrorism too high.  Terrorism is political in nature and seeks to change 
something the people have grievances towards, in this case it is lack of economic opportunity. 
 Chenoweth, Erica, “Is Terrorism Still a Democratic Phenomenon?", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 8, No 38
32 (Winter 2012), p. 85-100 
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Development aid sets its aim at the root cause of terrorism; the destitute people who have no 
other option than to take up violence. Like former secretary of state general Collin Powell said 
“We can’t just stop with a single terrorist or a single terrorist organization; we have to go and 
root out the whole system. We have to go after poverty.” The data proves that it is more effective 
to decrease the reason the people are disillusioned, rather than increase the ability of the state to 
suppress it. Which makes sense, it is better to reduce the effect of a future problem than to try to 
suppress a current problem This should have major implications to United States foreign policy 
and in the strategy on the war against terror. The United States leads the charge against global 
terrorism because of the reality altering attack on 9/11.  If the United States changes its foreign 
policy in regards to development aid rather than military support it would change how other 
countries approached the problem too.  The United States is a leader if we fight terror more 
efficiently, the rest of the world will follow suit.  
 It is important to conclude with a note that this will not eradicate terrorism, even if the 
link between economic development and terrorism, demonstrated here by the NBRM, is an 
effective way of combating terrorism it will not stop it all together.  However, it will reduce the 
instances as shown by the model.  This is because the links between poverty and terrorism are 
not the only factors that go into why acts of terrorism happen, the perpetrators of 9/11 were not 
poor, nor were they uneducated.  Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it existed prior to 9/11 and 
will exist long beyond it.  The reduction will come from the people who are desperate because of 
the lack of opportunity that terrorism becomes a means to survival.  The opportunity cost of 
taking up violence to acquire opportunity is high when there is nothing else, this is where 
economic development comes in.  Economic opportunity, that stems from growth, creates an 
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alternative to violence raising the opportunity cost of violence to a point where it is not 
sustainable. It is true not all developing countries have problems with terrorism, however the 
ones that do could benefit from foreign aid policies that prioritize economic development over 
raising military expenditure. 
 35
Bibliography 
Acevedo, Ivonne. Does Foreign Aid Have an Effect on Economic Growth? http://
chicagopolicyreview.org/2016/06/15/does-foreign-aid-have-an-effect-on-economic-
growth-new-research-adds-to-the-debate/ Chicago Policy Review. 2016. 
 Apodaca, Clair. Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool.  http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332 Oxford 
Research Encyclopedias. 2017  
Busse, Matthias & Königer, Jens. Trade and Economic Growth: A Re-examination of the 
Empirical Evidence. Hamburg Institute of International Economics. http://
www.hwwi.org/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/HWWI_Research_Paper-123_Trade-and-
Growth.pdf 
Butcher, Charity. Civil War and Terrorism: A Call for Further Theory Building. Oxford Research 
Encyclopedias. http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/
9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-520 
Center for Systematic Peace. Polity Project. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html 
Chenoweth, Erica, “Is Terrorism Still a Democratic Phenomenon?", Uluslararası İlişkiler, 
Volume 8, No 32 (Winter 2012), p. 85-100 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 1998. “On Economic Causes of Civil War” Oxford Economic  
Papers 563-573 
 36
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke.  2007. “Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms  
 Races?”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 1-27, February  
 2007 
 Enders, Walter and Sandler, Todd. The Political Economy of Terrorism. 2005 
Fearon, James. Iraq's Civil War. Foreign Affairs. March 2007. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/iraq/2007-03-01/iraqs-civil-war 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The Economic Impact of Terrorism on Developing Countries. 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/january/economic-impact-terrorism-
developing-countries 
Feyzioglu, Tarhan and Swaroop, Vinaya and Zhu, Min. 1998. “A Panel Data Analysis of the  
Fungibility of Foreign Aid” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12 No. 1: 29-58 
Global Terrorism Database. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
Gujarati, Damodar. Econometrics by Example, second edition. 2014 
Harford, Tim and Klein, Michael. 2005. “Aid and the Resource Curse”. The World Bank Group, 
 Public Policy for the Private Sector.  
Harriman, Jake. Linking Extreme Poverty and Global Terrorism. The New York Times. March 
13, 2012. https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/linking-extreme-poverty-and-
global-terrorism/  
Moss, Todd, Roodman, David, and Standley, Scott. The Global War on Terror and U.S.   
 Development Assistance: USAID allocation by country, 1998-2005.   
  https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2863_file_WP62_1.pdf Center for Global  
 Development. 2005 
 37
 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.      
 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. September 2002. 
Nielsen, Richard and Findley, Michael. 2011. “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed  
 Conflict.”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 219-232  
Nillesen, Eleonora and Ree, Jopp de.  2009.  “Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign  
 Aid on the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Journal of Development  
 Economics  
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://data.oecd.org 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The History of OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee. http://www.oecd.org/dac/1896808.pdf 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://public.tableau.com/views/
AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1 
Tahir, Nadia. 2017. “Does Aid Cause Conflict in Pakistan?”. Defense and Peace Economics,  
 28:1, 112-135,  
 United Nations Development Programme. About Sub-Saharan Africa. http://
www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/regioninfo.html  
The World Bank Group. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?
end=2016&start=1967.  
